



## **Starting Amachi: The Elements and Operation of a Volunteer-Based Social Program**

In the spring of 2003, less than two years after its establishment, the Philadelphia program known as Amachi had already arranged for some 542 adult “mentors” to provide guidance and friendship to some 700 children of particular disadvantage: one or both of their parents was in prison.<sup>1</sup> Amachi—a West African term meaning “who knows but what God has brought us through this child?”—was led by the city’s former Mayor W. Wilson Goode, who, at 65, had gone on, after two terms during the 1980s, to become and ordained minister and to earn a doctorate in divinity. The city’s first African-American chief executive, Goode had used his lifetime of contacts among the ministers of Philadelphia’s inner city black churches to recruit legions of volunteers from congregations ranging from those whose church buildings occupied whole city blocks to those housed in small storefronts in poverty-stricken North Philadelphia. Amachi had used the churches as vehicles to sign up volunteers in numbers many had doubted could be attracted and—even more important—had overseen the process of getting systems up and running such that those volunteers could be deployed. Every day, mentors and “mentees” were doing such things as having dinner together, going to parks, museums or baseball games, or working together on homework.

But the promise of Amachi for those leading and promoting the program transcended Philadelphia and those already enrolled. It was being viewed—not only by Wilson Goode but by the White House and President George W. Bush, who had come to Philadelphia especially to lend

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<sup>1</sup> Some mentors had been “matched” with more than one child—either because the first child with whom they had been matched had moved away or dropped out of the program for other reasons, or because the match, although considered successful, had run its course and the mentor was then matched with a new mentee.

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his support for it—both as a program with its own intrinsic value in helping children “at risk” but also as one which could serve as a template for other efforts to bring public and private funds together, along with religiously-inspired volunteers. There were hopes and plans that Amachi, with some 600 children enrolled in Philadelphia and smaller numbers in two other cities, could take root in cities across the US and, within five years, to have served as many as 100,000 children, for at least some period of time.<sup>2</sup>

For his part, Wilson Goode—the one-time Democratic mayor inspired by this cause to cooperate with a Republican White House in what President Bush had termed his “compassionate conservatism”—was cautiously confident that the pieces were about to fall into place such that Amachi, could, indeed, “go to scale,” that is, spread successfully to other cities by knitting together the labor of volunteers from religious congregations, management provided by non-profit social service organizations, and funds provided both by private foundations and the federal government—such as those promised by a new, \$9.5 million initiative from the federal Department of Health and Human Services, specifically earmarked for the mentoring of children of prisoners. Mentoring in general, and Amachi in particular, Goode believed, offered “a real opportunity to change the social fabric of this country on a long-term basis.”

### **Amachi: The Concept**

Although Wilson Goode was to become the figure most associated with Amachi, the initiative had actually been conceived more than two years before Goode took the reins in September 2000. Intellectually, Amachi was the child of the prominent University of Pennsylvania social scientist John Dilulio; programmatically it was the child of Public-Private Ventures, the nationally-known Philadelphia-based program evaluation firm, on whose board Dilulio served and with whose executive director, Gary Walker, he was close. Dilulio, director of the Center for Research on Religion and Urban Civil Society at the University of Pennsylvania, was well-known for his work on the terrible costs which crime imposed on poor, inner city neighborhoods. He was, however, someone with an interest in doing more than studying conditions in such areas; he was actively looking for ways to encourage steps to improve them. Taking an interest in the children of the incarcerated made sense for one familiar with the high rates of incarceration that had resulted from crackdowns on crime in the 1990s. Such children were, for instance, known to be at five times the risk even of other high-risk children in poor neighborhoods of falling into crime and winding up in prison. Dilulio had become convinced that churches were the best-organized and most influential institutions in those poor, African-American neighborhoods where both crime and incarceration rates were high. Dilulio was particularly enthusiastic about research—undertaken by his colleague Ram A. Cnaan at the University of Pennsylvania, which had shown that, in addition to their role as religious institutions, inner city churches in Philadelphia provided crucial social

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<sup>2</sup> It was estimated that there were 2.5 million children under age 18 who were children of incarcerated parents in the US, in 2003.

services, both for their congregants and their neighborhoods at large. “They are the paramedics of urban civil society,” Dilulio had observed, “saving lives and restoring health, answering emergencies with miracles.”<sup>3</sup>

The possibility of someone harnessing and augmenting the power of African-American congregations to deal with social problems such as those faced by the children of prisoners was part of a larger conversation which Dilulio, during late 1998 and early 1999, was having with Gary Walker of Public-Private Ventures (P/PV). Historically, the firm had specialized in winning contracts to use social science techniques to evaluate the effectiveness of new public social programs, as well as initiatives of foundations and major non-profit providers of social services. Walker, however, recalls that he had become increasingly convinced that new efforts to ameliorate the most stubborn problems of the poor and their neighborhoods were less likely to be large-scale government initiatives of the type which P/PV had honed its evaluation techniques. Instead, he recalls that, in the late 1990s, he was increasingly interested in efforts—whether publicly or privately funded—which might go after “low hanging fruit”—that is, directly touch the lives of small numbers of those with problems and to do so in a way that there was good reason to believe might help. “I think it’s fair to say,” Walker observes, “that the large-scale, federally-funded anti-poverty programs of the 1960s and 1970s were anomalous; they were not consistent with American political history. Americans prefer to help people as individuals, rather than looking for large, ‘system-changing’ cures. And they prefer to use established, local institutions they have confidence in.”

It was the combination of Dilulio’s research and Walker’s organizational strategy which were to lay the groundwork for Amachi. Nothing would likely have actually have happened, however, were it not for funds provided by Philadelphia’s Pew Charitable Trust which had, in 1992, established a specific religion department. During the same time period in early 1999 during which Dilulio and Walker were discussing ways in which inner city churches might be used in new ways to improve the lives of those in their neighborhoods, P/PV was, in fact, in the process of formally evaluating a previous Pew Religion Department effort—one which funded “intermediary organizations” which specialized in providing management consulting services to churches looking to expand or refine programs, such as child care or tutoring, which were already ongoing. P/PV had concluded that Pew’s funds had not been spent effectively. Says Walker: “They’d gotten very good at learning how to write proposals which could get funded but there was not a lot of evidence that new or better services were being delivered.” P/PV was, in turn, invited by the foundation to develop a series of initiatives to be known as Community-Serving Ministries Initiatives. These would efforts which Pew would fund through grants targeted directly to urban churches themselves. Recalls Terry Cooper, who joined PPV specifically to work on this project:

Pew made it clear they wanted to fundamentally restructure its giving through the Religion Department in a way that ... looked at the small- to

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<sup>3</sup> John Dilulio, remarks to the National Association of Evangelicals, Dallas, Texas, March 7, 2001.

medium-sized church that traditionally falls outside of the philanthropic stream of funding and see, is there a way to identify, enhance and leverage what they do. To get support directly to the church, in other words.

Funding for the Community-Serving Ministries Initiatives—set at \$500,000 per year for fiscal years 2000 and 2001—was to be funneled from Pew through PPV, which would solicit and review grant applications made by churches. “At first,” Terry Cooper recalls of this period, “we set out to be non-prescriptive. In other words, we weren’t going to tell them what sorts of things to do.” The idea of a large-scale mentoring project for the children of incarcerated parents emerged only after PPV, and Pew, turned away from the non-prescriptive model, having been dissatisfied with the quality of proposals they’d received. Recalls Terry Cooper, who reviewed proposals from churches with John Dilulio:

... it really became clear to us that many of these congregations just simply did not have the capacity that we thought they needed to be able to respond to an open-ended request-for-proposals. And that’s when we took the next step in the development of this and said, you know what? We are going to have to be a little bit prescriptive. We are going to have to define a model.

A mentoring program for the children of the incarcerated was one of four ideas which P/PV, working with Luis Lugo, the director of the Pew Religion Department, decided to develop.<sup>4</sup> The mentoring proposal, in particular, built on previous P/PV work in the field: a major 1996 study of the Big Brothers Big Sisters Association—a century-old non-profit synonymous with mentoring—had found that such efforts were effective. Little brothers and little sisters—or “mentees” in more contemporary terminology—had, P/PV’s evaluation had found, improved their performance and attitude at school, developed greater trust in adults and even improved their relationship with their families.<sup>5</sup> So it was that P/PV began to plan what for it was an uncharacteristic sort of initiative. An organization historically dedicated to evaluating programs undertaken by others would, with support from Pew, attempt itself to organize a mentoring program for the children of incarcerated parents itself. In keeping with its program evaluation specialty, P/PV planned, once it got the program up and running, simultaneously to manage the program and to track key indicators of its success or failure. Before things could get to that stage, however, the non-profit firm would have to find someone to lead Amachi who could successfully undertake such diverse tasks as convincing ministers from inner city churches to recommend volunteer mentors, implement a system to screen and track the volunteers once they were

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<sup>4</sup> The other initiatives were to focus on literacy, child care and job training/workforce development.

<sup>5</sup> Joseph P. Tierney and Jean B. Grossman, *Making a Difference: An Impact Study of Big Brothers Big Sisters of America*, Public/Private Ventures, 1995. The study found specifically that two-thirds of those mentored improved their academic performance and attitude toward school, and that 90 percent developing a higher level of trust in adults.

recruited, and, more broadly, develop ways to satisfy foundations, and, later, government, that the program was effective and well-administered. It was a job description that would lead PPV to Wilson Goode.

## **Enter Goode**

W. Wilson Goode Sr. had, at the time he came to Public/Private Ventures in September, 2000, had a long personal history of having held significant management positions. Not only had he twice been elected Mayor of Philadelphia but, prior to that, he had served as the city's top line executive (the equivalent of city manager), chairman of Pennsylvania's Public Utilities Commission, and, most recently, as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Education in the Clinton Administration. Just as relevant to the role he would assume as leader of Amachi, Goode, had in the years since he'd left the mayoralty in 1992, become both an ordained minister and a doctor of ministry. He had come, moreover, to believe that even large-scale social change had to begin with "individual transformation. And transformation is relational. That's something I got from (attending) seminary. This is a specific problem we can fix, in contrast to throwing dollars out there and hoping we hit something." In addition to such policy views, Goode had a deep, personal reason for agreeing to join the PPV staff and to take on the Amachi project: his own father had been in prison during Goode's childhood and he felt that he had been taken in and pointed on to the right road by the congregation of his own boyhood church (First Baptist Church of Paschall, Pennsylvania.)

Goode recalls wondering, when he agreed to take the job, whether P/PV was really committed to it—or was just taking advantage of the grant to find another pilot program to evaluate. "I'm not sure if anyone but myself really believed we could do it," says Goode. "But I believed that, with enough churches and enough volunteers, we could really make a difference. I was thinking about service, not evaluation." For its part, P/PV had no ambivalence about hiring Goode for the Amachi project. Recalls Gary Walker, "We needed someone who could bridge different worlds—including the churches and the funders. We were lucky Wilson was available because he was made-to-order in that way."

In the coming months (the last quarter of 2000 and the first half of 2001) Goode—and his Amachi colleagues on the staff of Public/Private ventures would have to play what might be called the role of social services general contractor—putting the many pieces of Amachi in place to create the program. The pieces would include: establishing "partnerships" with churches, from the ranks of whose congregations volunteer mentors would be drawn; identifying the children of prisoners and gaining approval of their families for them to participate in the program, finding a way both to screen volunteer mentors and to match them with the right child. Goode made the decision to start with the churches.

## Recruiting Churches

It was Wilson Goode's view that if Amachi did not have a significant group of volunteers pledged to serve as mentors, there was no point in beginning to work on other aspects of the program. In particular, he did not want to identify and sign up children of prisoners only to disappoint them were there not enough mentors to serve them all. But in order to sign up volunteers in sufficient number, Goode believed he had to work through the most significant institutions in Philadelphia's African-American community: its churches. But he knew well that recruiting volunteers from church congregations could not occur without the permission of individual church pastors. So it was that, in the fall of 2000, he set out to meet with ministers from 48 inner city churches.

The churches ranged greatly in size and character. A few were small storefronts; many, however, were widely-recognized, major institutions in their neighborhoods. The Greater Exodus Baptist Church, for instance, already had its own credit union, charter school and after-school program. Nor were the churches chosen at random. Rather, they were located in Philadelphia's highest-crime areas, grouped in four regions of North, West, and South Philadelphia. The choice of neighborhoods was based on the assumption that, in areas of higher crime, more adults would be imprisoned and thus, more children left without one or more of their parents. The Amachi approach would match mentors who were members of neighborhood congregations with children who lived in the neighborhood in which the church was located.

As he set about to gain the cooperation of ministers who might lead him to potential mentors, the former Mayor faced a number of obstacles, not the least of which were logistical. . Even arranging meetings with ministers was not easy. Many worked at their jobs only part-time. Church telephones were not always answered. Recalls Goode, "I realized that one of the keys was to get cellphone numbers for ministers, in order to be able to reach them consistently. Another key was to go out to the churches themselves. If we had invited them to come to center city to our office, it just never would have worked."

But even once in a meeting in a minister's church office, the program itself was not an automatic quick sell. Mentoring of the disadvantaged was not a novel idea and many churches had already undertaken their own, congregation-based "outreach." Goode, working with P/PV's Terry Cooper, sought to emphasize the ways in which Amachi differed from typical mentoring efforts. Says Cooper: "We believed Amachi was going to be different from what was already going on. We weren't only going to sign up mentors and have them meet in the church basement. We were going to match your mentors with appropriate kids, provide a consistent, accountable and formal program of case management and support, after the match was made.

Continues Cooper:

“Still, we’d go to a church and often the response was, well, we already mentor. We’ve been doing this for 2,000 years. Why do we need you? The great fear in the beginning from a lot of folks that to involve themselves in Amachi was to have people who were not from the neighborhood, who didn’t know the children, who didn’t know the particular conditions and needs, coming in and trying to force them into a predefined model, a box, if you will, when they’re saying, hey, we’ve been doing this for a long, long time. What’s the value-added of doing this and getting involved with you when probably all you’ll do is just put a lot of paperwork and stuff on us?”

Nor was Amachi the first outside program to seek access to church volunteers. Rev. Cean James of Bright Hope Baptist Church—one of North Philadelphia’s largest and best-known and whose cooperation was sought by Wilson Goode—observes:

“We’re approached all the time. We get proposals from the city, from Temple (University), from the University of Pennsylvania. We get them from other non-profit organizations.

In the beginning there is always hesitation from pastors to do programs that are given to them, when someone from the outside comes and says, ‘we’d like for you to supply volunteers to do X, Y, and Z.’ Because, usually, the program is a strain on the church. They’ll say in the beginning that we only need volunteers. It will turn out that it will take money, it will take space, and usually you’re asked to do it and after awhile, the people who asked you to do it kind of disappear.

Some of them that we’ve been involved in have just been horrible. The ground work hasn’t been done. The legwork hasn’t been done. Whenever you stand up on a Sunday and say, ‘we’re going to do this program, and you get everybody enthusiastic, there’s a risk. If the congregation never sees it come to fruition, it’s not a good thing. It’s going to be more difficult to get people active the next time.”

Amachi was itself planning to help calm fears of imposing a financial burden on churches by bringing a small amount of money to the table in its negotiations with ministers. It planned to provide a small stipend (\$6500 a year) for a church member to serve as the “church volunteer coordinator”—someone who would keep a master list of volunteers and track whether and how often and for how long they would meet with those whom they would mentor. Accepting outside funds turned out, however, not to be attractive to a small group of ministers. Some were particularly wary of the possibility that Amachi might, in time, bring with it public funding—especially after the inauguration, in January 2001, of President George W. Bush, who made clear his interest in directing public dollars to “faith-based” initiatives. “There were some,” recalls

Goode, “who just don’t want to lose control; they were very wary of anything that might come with strings attached.” The idea to funnel outside funds to the churches prompted two of 48 pastors whom Goode approached to reject participation in Amachi.

The overwhelming majority of ministers approached—42—however, agreed to bring their congregations into Amachi. (By 2003, the number of churches involved would rise to 50.) Among the key reasons, in Goode’s view, was an Amachi agreement that all volunteers would require the permission and recommendation of their pastor, in order to participate in Amachi. That gatekeeper’s role was a key one. It allowed pastors, observes Goode, to remain the authority figure for their congregation by giving them the responsibility to designate members whom they believed would be good mentors. With that responsibility, however, came the goal of trying to recruit and retain 10 volunteer mentors for Amachi.<sup>6</sup>

But, in the view of both P/PV staff members and ministers who pledged to help Amachi, it was Wilson Goode himself, perhaps more than any other single factor, which helped convince church leaders to agree to participate. Recalls Rev. Clifford Cutter of the Cornerstone Baptist Church:

“Talking to Dr. Goode, I had no reservations. Both of us being ministers or pastors, we went into the Bible, when he first talked to me about it. We dealt with the section in which the Lord had told Abraham that He would start with one man to save the city (Sodom and Gomorrah). And that’s how we got started with it. We were just laughing and sharing.. And then he told me about the incarceration of parents—how many hundreds, just in this area, are locked up. It was amazing. So he asked me to help and I said, yes. And we just started from there.”

Rev. James, too, emphasizes the crucial role he believes Wilson Goode played in church recruitment. “If someone approaches you who does not come more from the congregation side or the church side, someone who lacks an understanding of church dynamics, that could be a problem. You really have to be able to speak the language. And a lot of programs that have tried to come into Philadelphia have come from people who did not speak the language and for that reason they were rejected by many of the pastors in the city.” Notes Goode: “Some of the pastors are people with whom I’ve had a 40-year friendship.”

Not all of the ministers whom he visited agreed, however, to participate in Amachi only because of the value of the program or Wilson Goode’s powers of persuasion. Rev. Daly Barnes of Zion Baptist Church—one of North Philadelphia’s largest and previously led by the Rev. Leon Sullivan, a prominent civil rights activist—observes that major established African-American

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<sup>6</sup> It was Amachi’s goal to have an average of 10 mentors from each church in each of its four neighborhood-based church “clusters.” Although Goode hoped to have at least 10 from every church, he recognized that congregations differed greatly in size and thus did not require 10 for continuing participation in the program.



churches were, to some extent, in competition for members—especially active members—because so many congregants had left inner city neighborhoods and moved to suburban areas. Part of the effort to attract and retain congregants, notes Barnes, must involve programs which engage volunteers. “If we didn’t have Amachi,” he says, “we’d be at a disadvantage in that way.”

### **From Ministers to Mentors**

In beginning to put together the idea of Amachi into actual operation, Goode had decided that, even before identifying children who would be “mentees,” it would be best to sign up volunteer mentors—and to take steps to ensure that there were no problems in their backgrounds that might disqualify them from participation. The decision to seek mentors before enrolling children stemmed from Goode’s concern that “these were kids who’d been disappointed too many times before. We didn’t want to get them excited about the program and then have to tell them we didn’t have a mentor for them.”

From the outset, Goode was more ambitious, recalls Jodina Hicks—who assisted Goode, serving as Amachi coordinator in the program’s first year—than P/PV had initially been. Recalls Hicks: “The organizational goal that PPV set would have been a hundred mentors. Reverend Goode’s goal, right at the outset, was at least 400.” In Goode’s view, even this was a very modest start: an estimated total of 20,000 Philadelphia children had an incarcerated parent. Mentors would be asked to agree to meet with the child with whom they were matched for at least one hour each week for at least one year.

Recruitment of the potential mentors took several forms. Individual ministers might bring the program to the attention of their congregation on Sunday morning. Wilson Goode himself might be asked to address either the congregation or, a smaller group within it. Church men’s groups were of special interest to Goode because he knew that men were a disproportionately small portion of congregations but that he would need a significant complement of males to serve boys as mentors. In some churches, ministers simply nominated members who they believed were well-suited to mentoring and gave their names to Goode and Hicks. In fact, no matter how an individual member was recruited, each potential mentor would be required by Amachi to have a “pastoral reference”—a minister’s recommendation—in order to be considered for the program.

The pastoral reference was just part of a larger process that would be undertaken to screen mentors and match them with potential “mentees.” Even as that process got underway, however, Wilson Goode and Jodina Hicks, confident now that Amachi could attract a complement of mentors, set about on the next stage of the program: finding children who had parents in prison and gaining permission to enroll them in Amachi.

## Finding the Children

The mere fact that many of the prisoners incarcerated in the Philadelphia area had left children behind at home did not mean that Amachi could simply send mentors to their homes and start to work. Identifying and enrolling specific children would prove to be a somewhat difficult process, one with a number of false starts.

As Amachi was getting underway—even before Wilson Goode was hired—Public/Private ventures staff had hoped that a partnership with another, well-established group with an interest in prisoners and their children might lead, quickly and easily, to children to be mentored. Prison Fellowship Ministries was a prominent national, Christian evangelical program “centered on the recognition that Jesus Christ alone has the authority and power to make broken lives new.” Prison Fellowship brought volunteers into prisons to urge inmates to undertake “regeneration of a sinful heart” through Bible study and ultimately to become “consecrated followers of Jesus Christ.” In addition to its in-prison work, PF also had programs for the families of those incarcerated, including a specific program for their children. The Angel Tree program arranged, through the same churches from which PF’s prison ministry volunteers came, to send the children of prisoners to Christian summer camps. In addition, Angel Tree arranged for them to receive presents at Christmas—the origin of the program’s name.

Gary Walker, PPV executive director, recalls that working with Angel Tree “seemed like an obvious match.” The partnership did not, however, work out—with the role of religion a key point of division.

Prison Fellowship was explicitly dedicated to an effort to lead prisoners and their families to religious belief. Amachi, in contrast, sought to harness the willingness of religious individuals to help others, not to proselytize either those incarcerated or their children. Says Jodina Hicks, “Many of the Amachi churches are Baptist, or United Methodist, and, those churches teach that your relationship with God should lead you to give to others, not to save others, but to give to others: the poor, the homeless, the naked, the fatherless, people who are in prison. That is a mandate of most of the churches that we’re working with.”

Amachi did not plan to avoid the topic of religion. Far from it. Mentors and children might well attend church together. But its fundamental goals were companionship and guidance, not religious conversion per se. Despite the fact that Angel Tree offered a ready list of the children of the incarcerated, the two programs did not choose to work cooperatively. Enrolling children would require, instead, the personal efforts of Wilson Goode and Jodina Hicks.

Goode and Hicks turned to the prisons themselves—more specifically, to the five correctional facilities maintained by the City of Philadelphia Prisons System. PPS housed, on average, 7,000 persons, both men and women, who were either awaiting trial or had been

sentenced to a prison term of two years or less. A great many of those doing time in these facilities had come from many of the same neighborhoods in which Amachi churches were located. At first, moreover, this system appeared to offer an important additional recruiting advantage: a sympathetic top official—Alan Appel, deputy commissioner and the director of inmate services—who would, in turn, ask others in the system with regular contact with prisoners to find out if they had children and, if so, to seek their permission to enroll the children in Amachi.

The first group of officials to whom Goode and Hicks would turn were themselves religious officials—the five prison chaplains from a variety of denominations who regularly visited each of the Philadelphia jails, providing both spiritual guidance to those incarcerated and often assisting them with a range of personal problems, including those involving family.<sup>7</sup> Goode and Hicks hoped that the chaplains would, in effect, serve as Amachi’s salesmen—distributing a brochure about the program, posting notices about it, and reporting back with the names and phone numbers of children whose parents had approved participation in Amachi. But the returns on this approach were “slow, very slow,” recalls Jordana Hicks.

“We might have gotten 20 names in two weeks,” she recalls. Nor did the numbers increase when Goode and Hicks turned to another group—the jails’ social workers, who provided regular mental health services for prisoners—to serve as the Amachi advance guard. The system’s 50 social workers were only able to bring in the names of 35 or so possible mentees. Observes Jordana Hicks: “The prisoners wanted to see the faces of who it was that was running this program. I really think that was the bottom line concern, because the social workers were able to answer most of the detailed questions on logistics.”

So it was that W. Wilson Goode—as well known among Philadelphia’s prison population as he was among the ministers of North and West Philadelphia—would himself become the chief salesman for Amachi. Goode and Hicks began to visit the jails themselves, addressing large gatherings of those incarcerated. They found that the obstacles to volunteering the names of children involved more than questions about Amachi’s goals and methods. There were subtle, personal concerns, as well, such as the effect the advent of a mentor might have on an inmate’s relationship with a child after that parent’s departure from prison. Says Hicks: “We were asked many times, ‘is someone going to be taking my place?’” Inmates were reassured that that was not the intention of Amachi.

Wilson Goode’s presentations in the facilities of the Philadelphia Prisons System deliberately avoided the emotional appeals often associated with Baptist preachers—for fear that such appeals might be (in Jordana Hicks’ term) “manipulative.” But the personal appeal by Goode himself and the matter-of-fact descriptions of Amachi and its goals proved compelling. By early 2002, the Amachi staff had collected almost 2,000 names of children who might be mentored.

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<sup>7</sup> The chaplains included a Catholic priest, a Baptist minister, an Islamic imam, a rabbi and a woman minister.

This large-scale response, though much welcome by the Amachi staff, hardly settled the question of which children would participate in the program. Not only were there more children volunteered than Amachi had mentors (that total stood at about 500) but obtaining referrals from an incarcerated parent was just the first step toward a child's eventual participation. Next, the Amachi staff would have to contact each child's "caregiver"—perhaps the other biological parent (although this was true in a minority of cases), perhaps a grandparent, perhaps another family member or a step-parent—to gain that person's permission for a mentor to meet with the child. Amachi would, after all, be reliant on caregivers to allow mentors to enter the child's home or to bring the child to a church or other location where the two would meet.

Just as it was initially difficult for Wilson Goode, at first, to arrange appointments with many ministers, getting touch with individual caregivers proved to be a logistical challenge. Much of the information—about 45 percent of the addresses and phone numbers—provided by prisoners proved to be inaccurate or outdated. But even when phone numbers were accurate, caregivers were difficult to reach; many worked late shifts and did not return home until late in the evening, for instance. Wilson Goode found that Amachi had to hire additional, part-time staff to phone caregivers and to deploy that staff at odd hours. Nonetheless, there were false starts. At first, Amachi sent letters to caregivers, describing the program.

Phone conversations revealed, however, that virtually none of those to whom the letters had been sent had read them and a new letter and legal permission form had to be sent after the phone contact. (Eventually, the procedure was changed to make the telephone call the first point of contact, followed by the letter.)

Contact with caregivers led to other complications, as well. In some instances, there were siblings in the households—some of whom also had a parent in prison, some of whom did not. To avoid tension, Amachi decided that siblings would be eligible. ( In one case, the policy would ultimately lead to the assignment of 10 mentors to a single household. ) What's more, not all caregivers wanted children in their charge to participate—in some cases, because of animosity toward the incarcerated parent. Other caregivers expressed concern that they would not have time to prepare children to meet with mentors. Ultimately, the caregivers for 15 percent of the 1100 children for whom Amachi had an up-to-date address and phone number decided not to permit the children to participate. Those that did agree were, for the most part, enrolling children between age 8 and 10. Fifty five percent were boys, 45 percent girls. Thus, with 500-plus mentors signed up and more than 900 children available, Amachi would have to start operations with a waiting list.

### **Screening the Mentors : Big Brothers, Big Sisters**

Even as the recruitment of potential Amachi children was continuing, so, too, was the process of screening those who had volunteered to be mentors. The recommendation from a minister was only the first step in that process. That reference was one of three required

recommendations—none of which could come from a potential mentor’s own family. Instead, recommendations had to come from such third parties as employer or community leader. The recommendation requirement was linked to a system that would provide crucial, legal protection for Amachi, once actual mentoring operations got underway, as well as professional oversight of the program. Both services would be provided by Philadelphia’s Big Brothers, Big Sisters chapter.

Even before Wilson Goode came to the organization, Public/Private Ventures had approached the Big Brothers Big Sisters Association Southeastern Pennsylvania to ascertain whether it would be interested in assisting in Amachi’s operation. The BBBSA chapter offered specific, operational advantages. The century-old organization (whose Philadelphia chapter dated to 1915) was identified nationally with the concept of mentoring as a means to help the disadvantaged. Moreover, it had well-established procedures to screen and orient potential mentors. These included a police check, child abuse clearance, three references, two interviews, and a home assessment, the latter an evaluation of such matters as the cleanliness and organization of a mentor’s home. These procedures allowed the area BBBSA chapter to purchase insurance to protect itself from liability to which the actions of one of its mentors might expose it. Still, liability insurance was not inexpensive, comprising 2 percent of the annual \$3.2 million annual budget of the chapter.

BBBSA’s experience clearly marked it as useful to Amachi. But the BBBSA had its own good reasons to join in such a partnership. New leadership, both in the national organization and the local chapter, hoped to increase the reach of the organization which, at the time Amachi was getting started, had only 800 mentors at work in Philadelphia. Recruitment, explains Marlene Olshan, appointed executive director of the Philadelphia chapter in October, 2002., had historically been “retail,” via advertising which invited individuals to approach the organization. Amachi, in contrast, offered BBBSA access to what Olshan terms “volunteer -rich environments”—the Amachi churches. Amachi, too, could give BBBSA access to a demographic group of which it was much in need—African-American males.

So it was that BBBSA agreed to screen and match Amachi mentors, as well as provide group training for the volunteers, to be held at churches rather than the organization’s own offices. The orientation sessions would help prepare mentors for issues which BBBSA believed were likely to arise.

By early January, 2001, the Amachi program had, from its 42 churches, a list of some 400 volunteer mentors, approved by BBBSA and waiting to be “matched” with children. Notably, although all attended churches in high-crime, Amachi-designated neighborhoods, relatively few actually lived in the neighborhoods. Many had moved to middle-class, suburban neighborhoods, while continuing to attend church in the inner city. Indeed, it was estimated that only 20 percent of those attending the city’s urban, African-American churches continued to live in their immediate neighborhoods. Matching mentors with mentees, then, required much more than comparison of

who lived nearby whom. Rather, it was a subtle process overseen by the BBBS staff of 8 case workers—professional social workers—who considered the age, interests and gender of both adult and child. (Although the organization did not follow a race-conscious policy in matching its “bigs and littles,” it did defer to the wishes of caregivers, many of whom did want a same-race match.) No match was formalized until a BBSA case worker had visited the homes of both prospective mentor and mentee. The BBBS case work staff would, says executive director Olshan, likely have been overwhelmed by the new work load had it not eventually increased in size to accommodate Amachi, thanks to new, external funding attracted by the Amachi initiative.<sup>8</sup> The City of Philadelphia’s had directed \$300,000—a share of the city’s so-called “prevention” funds from the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families federally-funded public welfare program—specifically to help support the Big Brothers Big Sisters staff assigned to Amachi.<sup>9</sup> Some of these new cases workers had started with Amachi as church volunteer coordinators, before being hired by Big Brothers/Big Sisters.

## Operations

As matches between mentors and mentees began to be made over the course of the first half of 2002, the Amachi staff did not understand its work to be done. Rather, it began to build an operational infrastructure to track the ongoing operation of the program—to ensure that mentoring would meet quality standards, that it was, in fact, ongoing and that data for evaluation of the program would be gathered.

The 40-plus Amachi churches were divided into four, geographic regions. As the program got underway, mentors from each region met as a group at one of the larger churches for an orientation run by Big Brothers/Big Sisters. Mentors were asked to strive to meet with children at least four hours a month. They were given some idea of what to expect—for instance that it was not uncommon for those being mentored to be shy and unforthcoming for the first six months of the relationship. “We tell people not to give up or to blame themselves,” says BBSA’s Marlene Olshan. “After six months, they won’t be able to get the kids to be quiet.” Mentors were told, as well, that they should not set explicit goals, such as improving a child’s work in school. Rather, they should simply be a reliable companion, taking children on outings, being available should the child want to confide in them or ask questions. One mentor (ironically, a former manager of a fast food restaurant) observes that “many of these kids have hardly been out of their own neighborhoods. When I took (his mentee) out to Olive Garden, I think it was the first time he went to a restaurant that wasn’t McDonald’s or Burger King.” The fact that the children were generally pre-adolescent and, although at risk to develop problems were not generally in trouble already,

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<sup>8</sup> Olshan notes that “BBBS SEPA has committed substantial resources—both human capital and financial—to this program above and beyond what we receive via Public/Private Ventures from Pew.”

<sup>9</sup> The oversight agency for the city—to which the BBBSA chapter had to report regarding spending of the TANF funds—was its Public Health Management Corporation.

proved attractive to mentors. Observes Gayle Washington, a longtime professional social worker, with a degree from the University of Pennsylvania, who became an Amachi volunteer: “I wanted out of social service because what was missing with the people that I was working with was that hope, that sense of hope. I just thought we needed to start earlier. I’ve worked in foster care, I’ve worked in child abuse prevention, I’ve worked in the medical field. There was that hopelessness that was making the difference to me. And I needed to be free to do that without being constrained by a secular organization, afraid that I may pray for someone or something like that.

As mentoring got underway, so did a system of regular reporting. Each mentor was required to keep a regular log of meetings with his assigned child and regularly report to his church volunteer coordinator (CVC) about the length and frequency of meetings. The CVC, in turn, compiled a report for all the volunteers from that church, to be forwarded to a Community Impact Director—community leaders paid with Amachi funds. . The CIDs maintained overall Amachi mentor/mentee meeting and frequency records for their own region. They were also available to advise mentors or otherwise intervene if a family or child appeared to be in crisis. CIDs would also let ministers and church volunteer coordinators know if their congregation was falling short of the target of 4 hours’ meetings per month per mentor. (CID’s were not, however, Amachi/PPV employees. One local minister, for instance, served as a CID through a “leased services contract” which effectively paid his church to pay him. It was regarded as important for the CIDs not be viewed as bureaucrats working in center city offices.)

For his part, Wilson Goode continued to pay quarterly visits to individual pastors. Should churches regularly fall short of the mentoring goals, he had the discretion to drop a congregation from the program.

### **New Funding, New Structure**

Even in the earliest days of its operation, in the summer of 2001, Amachi had begun to attract significant public attention. This was, in no small part, the result of the fact that John Dilulio, its early theoretician, had, with the election of George W. Bush, been named to head a new White House Office of Faith-Based Initiatives—predicated on the idea that public monies to improve the lives of the disadvantaged might be put to effective use directly through religious congregations. (Historically, public funds had been directed to non-profit social service organizations with clear ties to religion—such as Catholic Charities—but not to congregations themselves.) On July 4, 2001, President Bush himself came to Philadelphia to extol the idea of mentoring generally and Amachi in particular, speaking—and playing football—at a street fair held outside the Greater Exodus Baptist Church in North Philadelphia. Appearing outside Independence Hall, Bush noted the importance of the “familiar American spirit of faith and good works ... of acts of great kindness and charity.”

The Bush appearance did not lead to any immediate federal appropriations to assist Amachi. It was, however, part of a chain of events which, over time, led to federal support for Amachi and similar efforts in other cities. The most immediate impact of federal assistance came through Americorps—the federal program started in the Clinton Administration which paid a small annual stipend and college tuition assistance for those who volunteered their services at non-profit and other community institutions.

Americorps came to Amachi in the spring of 2002 through the efforts of Mark Scott, the assistant director of Americorps' parent organization, the Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS). Scott, however, was also a former top aide to John Dilulio at the White House Office of Faith-Based Initiatives, who had come to that position after working with the Rev. Eugene Rivers at Boston's Ten Point Coalition, an organization which used churches and their ministers as part of an effort to reduce violence in a high-crime, high-poverty section of Boston. Through his work with the Coalition, Scott had known Wilson Goode—and through John Dilulio he came to know of Amachi. At Scott's suggestion, Public Private Ventures applied, in April, 2002, to gain Americorps funding for the 42 church volunteer coordinators, who'd been paid, to that point, through PPV's grant funds. (The Pew monies had, by then, been augmented by funds from the William E. Simon Foundation, a New York-based socially conservative fund.) Technically, PPV became a sub-grantee of the Mid-Atlantic Network of Youth and Family Services, a non-profit service provider which had itself been granted Americorps "slots" directly by CNCS.

<sup>10</sup>

Americorps funding provided a new source of support for the Church Volunteer Coordinators, who had been supported by grant funds directed to their churches. Instead, in the Americorps model, the funds went directly to the "volunteer," who served for two years. In the view of PPV's Terry Cooper, who played the lead role in writing the grant application for the Americorps funds, it was a change for the better. "Americorps represents the most flexible set of tools that we can utilize, because Americorps money goes directly to the member. It doesn't pass through the church so the church is not going to be encumbered by someone who's going to walk in the door and want to inspect my books kind of issues. So we (Amachi/PPV) can manage those people in place, essentially doing the same things they were doing before but with more resources and more support. And the Americorps model allows me, within the broad parameters of our objectives we set up, to let this person work in a very idiosyncratic fashion according to local conditions in that congregation and that neighborhood."

Cooper hoped that another program directed by the Corporation for Community and National Service could provide similarly flexible support for another part of the Amachi operation.

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<sup>10</sup> Americorps positions were allocated through two mechanisms. Some went through state government, which then decided to which local organizations they should be directed. Others were termed "national direct" slots, and were allocated by Washington directly to umbrella social service agencies which, in turn, had discretion as to which organizations to support.



By the spring of 2003, the program had decided to drop the four Community Impact Director positions. Instead, the major responsibility for recruiting and managing volunteers would lie with the church volunteer coordinators, who would be overseen by the Big Brothers/Big Sisters case workers. Wilson Goode and Terry Cooper, however, hoped that the BBBS staff would soon be supplemented by members of the Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) program; VISTA, more than three decades old and once colloquially referred to as the “domestic Peace Corps,” differed from Americorps in that its members were paid, federal employees, receiving salaries not just a stipend. But like Americorps members, they could work directly for non-profit service providers at tasks determined by the provider itself. It was Amachi’s intention for VISTA members to assist BBBS caseworkers but to focus not on matching mentors and mentees—which required professional social work expertise—but on the oversight tasks formerly performed by the Community Impact Director, such as keeping records of mentoring time and assisting if a congregation was failing to meet its mentoring target. In fact, by the spring of 2003, with Amachi up and running smoothly, the specific position of Community Impact Director had been abolished.

### **Accomplishments and Plans**

During the first nearly two years of Amachi’s operations (April 2001 through March, 2003), the program, according to a June, 2003 internal history, matched 556 mentors and children. From the regular reports of mentors and church volunteer coordinators, the program found that, although mentors had pledged to meet with their mentee for just an hour a week over the course of a year, mentors were, on average, meeting less frequently than that (an average of twice per month) but for longer time periods (on average, 7.3 hours per month.) An Amachi report noted “In general, the longer the match had lasted, the more time the mentor and child were spending together each month. For example, matches that had been active for four to six months had met an average of 5.4 hours a month over their lifetime, while matches that had been active for 10-12 months or longer had met an average of 9.1 hours a month. In part, this could simply indicate that in stronger matches—those that develop and endure—the mentor and child were spending more time from the beginning. But it also suggests that, at least in some cases, the pair spent increasing amounts of time together as trust and closeness developed.”<sup>11</sup> Notably, 42 percent of all mentors recruited were men, notwithstanding the fact that Amachi estimated that as few as 20 percent of members of Amachi congregations were males.

However, not all Amachi matches continued for more than the one-year initial goal. The program’s May, 2003 internal history noted that “of the 536 mentor-child matches created from April, 2001 through January, 2003, 301 matches, or 56 percent were active as of the end of January, 2003 ... An additional 235 matches have ended. In 72 of those cases, volunteers met their commitment to mentor for at least a year and then elected not to continue with the relationship ...

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<sup>11</sup> Linda Jucovy, Amachi: Mentoring Children of Prisoners in Philadelphia, Public/Private Ventures and The Center For Research on Religion and Urban Society, June, 2003

The remaining 163 matches—or 30 percent of the matches overall—terminated in less than 12 months ... The majority of matches that ended in less than a year did so because of circumstances surrounding the children, and it suggests the extent to which many of their lives are marked by complications and disruptions.”<sup>12</sup>

In discussing the effects of Amachi, Goode and others at PPV referred to the organization’s existing study on the effectiveness of the Big Brothers Big Sisters program which they believed demonstrated that the positive outcomes of mentoring had been clearly established. The program, moreover, hoped to undertake an evaluation of its impact on individual children through a retrospective evaluation of measures of child achievement and attitude maintained by the Philadelphia public schools. Already, Amachi, had compiled the results of a survey of mentors and caregivers and found that “93 percent of mentors and 82 percent of caregivers reported that the child had shown improved self-confidence, and 61 and 60 percent, respectively, said the child had an improved ‘sense of future’. The majority of both mentors and caregivers reported that the child showed improved academic performance and classroom behavior. BBBS administers the same questionnaire in its other community-based programs and preliminary findings from those surveys suggest that Amachi, thus far, is as successful as those programs.”<sup>13</sup>

Wilson Goode and others involved with Amachi were, however, careful to remain sober in their assessments of the program—noting, for instance, that it would take many years before the long-term measures of the program’s impact (such as lower rates of incarceration for the children of incarcerated parents who participate in mentoring) could be judged.

Amachi did, however, have ambitious hopes, in the late spring of 2003, to expand to other cities. It had already started to do so. A small, satellite program—also supported by Pew funds and operated in conjunction with Big Brothers Big Sisters of Southeastern Pennsylvania—had been established in the low-income municipality of Chester, Pennsylvania. A grant from the New York-based Pinkerton Foundation had allowed it to establish a 10-church program in Brooklyn. Oversight was maintained by Rev. Goode and Amachi staff from Philadelphia but included a local advisory board, one of whose members was New York Senator Hilary Clinton. Wilson Goode, however, saw the program’s best hope for much larger-scale expansion as resting, in part, on federal funding. In mid-May 2003, the federal Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, released a request for applications for “financial assistance for the FY 2003 Mentoring Children of Prisoners Program.” Although the program announcement did not mention Amachi, the description of the type of applications sought was very much reminiscent of the Philadelphia program and had, indeed, been developed in consultation with PPV. “The purpose of this program is to make competitive grants ... to support

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Amachi Evaluation results, cited in Ibid. Big Brothers Big Sisters of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 2002. “The questionnaires were administered to approximately 30 volunteers and 30 parent/caregivers. “

the establishment and operation of programs using a network of public and private entities to provide mentoring services for these children.” Some \$9.5 million in total grants would be made.

The Amachi staff anticipated that a substantial majority—perhaps more than two-thirds—of the mentoring grants approved by HHS after the July 15, 2003 application deadline would go to Big Brothers Big Sisters chapters across the US, most of which had not previously received nor relied upon federal grants. The national leadership of the organization had gone on record expressing its hope to expand the Amachi concept to 43 new cities and to serve 28,500 children a year by 2006. The national Big Brothers/Big Sisters organization had come to the conclusion that many children of incarcerated parents lived in neighborhoods in which the organization was already active. The organization had, moreover, developed detailed list of the program elements it believed would be necessary for success in any city. These included “an Amachi champion”—“a well-respected and inspirational religious or secular leader in the local faith-based community”; “a significant and prominent role for each local church” and “a systematic process of identifying youth of incarcerated parents by collaborating with local government entities that know who the children are and how they can be reached.”<sup>14</sup> Amachi—cognizant of the fact that there were an estimated 2.5 million children of incarcerated parents across the US—also hoped that funds would be apportioned to a range of other non-profit groups, including The National Ten Points Leadership Foundation—the church-based group founded in Boston by the Rev. Eugene Rivers, which hoped to mentor 5,000 children; Prison Fellowship (which Amachi hoped would add mentoring to the Angel Tree summer camp and Christmas gift program and might serve 10,000 children; the U.S. Dream Academy, an organization which provided social and academic assistance to “high-risk” youth generally and Amachi hoped might serve 3,000 children; the National Religious Affairs Association, an organization of 16 religious denominations tied to the National Association of Blacks in Criminal Justice, which had already agreed to take on the mentoring of children of incarcerated parents and, beginning at a special meeting on the topic in July 2003, hoped to train 25,000 mentors. Local governments were also free to seek the HHS funds and Amachi hoped that at least 10 local governments would do so and would serve 1,000 children each.

Wilson Goode believed that, as it grew, moreover, Amachi could become less reliant on African-American inner city churches. He had already recruited volunteers from one predominantly white suburban church in Philadelphia (Proclamation Presbyterian, the volunteers from which conducted their mentoring sessions at an inner city church, rather than meeting mentees at home) and believed some non-inner city churches generally might take up the call to mentor.

Goode adds, however, that, “I can’t imagine that non-inner city churches would ever supply more than 10 percent of Amachi mentors. If it gets to be more than 10 percent, that would

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<sup>14</sup> Amachi “Project Outline,” Big Brothers, Big Sisters Association of America, May 2003.

change the character of the program. It's important to keep the major focus on the indigenous churches in the neighborhoods."

That there did not appear to be a likelihood that Amachi could grown enough to reach all 2.5 million children of prisoners did not discourage Goode. "I don't think it's possible in the short term," he says, "to reach 2.5 million children. What we can do, in my view, is to make a significant dent in the problem, so much so that down the road there will be a reduction in the number of inmates entering jail. But no one I know of is talking about trying to mobilize enough mentors to reach 2.5 million children." Among the strategies Amachi might consider, according to Goode: formally focusing on children between five and 12 (already the majority of those being mentored), or even, perhaps, a more targeted group—perhaps between ages six and nine—if, for instance, evaluation research demonstrated that mentoring was most effective during that period.

Nothing in the HHS request for applications would have the effect of mandating the Amachi approach, point by point. But Wilson Goode and PPV hoped to influence the evolving practice of mentoring children of the incarcerated through the establishment, in Philadelphia, of the Amachi Training Institute, envisioned as a resource with which local organizations mentoring the children of the incarcerated—both through public and private funding, and with paid and volunteer staff—would contract for training, to be delivered in Philadelphia—in part through direct observation of the original Amachi program. There were plans, as well, for the development of an Amachi-produced, 9 five-to seven minute long "intake video" which could be shown to prison inmates in participating cities.

Notwithstanding the newly-announced HHS funding, there were also some storm clouds on the Amachi horizon. Specifically, it seemed likely that overall funding of Americorps stipends could be reduced substantially. Two factors were widely viewed as underlying the prospective reduction. Although President Bush had publicly called for expansion of the program, some Congressional Republicans had long been concerned that paying "volunteers" was a contradiction in terms and might discourage unpaid volunteering. In addition, the program had been hit by a General Accounting Office report critical of its procedures for setting aside funds to pay potential college assistance for those who completed two years in the program. The possibility of having to set aside more such funds in advance than the Corporation for National and Community Service had done was estimated, in June 2003, to mean that there might be available funding for only half of the 50,000 positions previously supported.

For his part, however, Wilson Goode remained committed and optimistic about Amachi—and inspired by the sorts of stories about its success he heard regularly as he round the circuit of Amachi churches in some of Philadelphia's toughest neighborhoods. Among those stories was one told to Goode by The Rev. Herbert Cutter of Cornerstone Baptist Church, concerning the effect one Amachi child had on his family and, ultimately, the church.

“Their lives were just in the street,” recalls Cutter of the child’s family. They were people just hanging on the corner. But because of the mentoring program showing interest in this child, they saw that people do care. You’d be surprised how many people in this neighborhood feel that nobody cares. One thing we keep in mind is what Dr. Goode said to us when we first started the mentoring program. ‘Don’t disappoint the children because they’ve been disappointed enough in life. So whatever you do, make sure if you have an appointment, keep the appointment.’ And that’s what we did. And when we took up the mentoring program and reached out and touched just that one child., then his mother saw that some people do care. And her mother told other relatives and friends. And they started coming here to church, 20 or 30 of them, and now they’re members here. When they came, everyone would just touch them and talk to them and show an interest. Just caring for someone, just showing love, made a difference.”

**Exhibit 1**

Public/Private Ventures

*Amachi Mentoring Program*

For the Period: October 1, 2003 to September 30, 2003

Project Plan / Budget for FY03

| <b>Description</b>  | <b>Project Cost</b> | <b>FY03 Q2 March 03</b> |                 |
|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|
| Salaries and Fringe | \$350,262           | \$22,732                | \$7,578         |
| Consulting Services | 20,000              | 12,000                  | 4,000           |
| Travel              | 10,000              | 500                     | 168             |
| Data Processing     | 16,000              | 1,000                   | 334             |
| Other Expenses      | 37,572              | 1,350                   | 450             |
| Site Grants         | 518,000             | 61,300                  | 20,432          |
| <b>Total</b>        | <b>\$951,834</b>    | <b>\$98,882</b>         | <b>\$32,961</b> |

| <b>P/PV Staff</b>       | <b>Days</b> | <b>FTE</b> |
|-------------------------|-------------|------------|
| W. Wilson Goode         | 220         | 100%       |
| Terry Cooper            | 220         | 100%       |
| Shirley Hamilton        | 160         | 73%        |
| Pat Middleton           | 220         | 100%       |
| Wendy McClanahan        | 40          | 18%        |
| Shawn Bauldry           | 18          | 8%         |
| Project Data Specialist | 64          | 29%        |

\$991,343

|              |                |
|--------------|----------------|
| Mar-03       | 39,509         |
| FY 03 Q3     | 125,081        |
| FY 03 Q4     | 91,385         |
| FY 04 Q1     | 99,451         |
| FY 04 Q2     | 87,371         |
| FY 04 Q3     | 45,842         |
| FY 04 Q4     | 61,361         |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>550,000</b> |
| Mott Amount  | 550,000        |

**Exhibit 2**  
**FY 2002 Grantee Awards**

- In this first year the Family and Youth Services Bureau (FYSB) received 424 eligible applications from 45 states and Puerto Rico.
- Panels were conducted in Washington D.C. during a two week period in August. Family and Youth Services Bureau staff members were on site to provide guidance and assure process integrity.
- The bureau selected 52 potential grantees in 29 states to receive approximately 9 million dollars to support mentoring in the first year.
- FYSB expects that these 52 programs will serve over 6,000 young people in the first year of the initiative at an average federal cost of \$1,500 per match
- A broad distribution of funded projects included rural, tribal and urban locations. Twenty eight projects will serve fewer than 100 children, seventeen projects will serve between 200 and 300 children and seven projects will serve over 300 children in the first year.
- Of the 52 grantees 27 projects were faith-based or projects that partnered with faith-based programs. (These numbers are estimates based on a review of the 52 applicant's submissions.)

**Exhibit 3**  
**FY 2003 MCP Decision Memo 1**

| Organization   | City         | State | Zip        | Recommended funding level | Approved and Funded |
|--|--------------|-------|------------|---------------------------|---------------------|
| Alabama Attorney General's Office                          | Montgomery   | AL    | 36130      | \$461,568 x               |                     |
| Alternatives for Girls                                     | Detroit      | MI    | 48208      | \$100,000 x               |                     |
| Big Brothers Big Sisters Association of Central Ohio, Inc. | Columbus     | OH    | 43229      | \$256,932 x               |                     |
| Big Brothers Big Sisters of Greater Charlotte              | Charlotte    | NC    | 28202      | \$238,500 x               |                     |
| Big Brothers Big Sisters of DE, Inc                        | Wilmington   | DE    | 19804      | \$82,500 x                |                     |
| Big Brothers Big Sisters of Eastern Missouri               | St. Louis    | MO    | 63108      | \$193,500 x               |                     |
| Big Brothers Big Sisters of Metropolitan Milwaukee         | Milwaukee    | WI    | 53214-4473 | \$400,000 x               |                     |
| Big Brothers Big Sisters of Metropolitan Portland          | Portland     | OR    | 97211      | \$105,000 x               |                     |
| Big Brothers Big Sisters of Southeastern PA                | Philadelphia | PA    | 19109      | \$450,000 x               |                     |
| Big Brothers Big Sisters, Alamo Area                       | San Antonio  | TX    | 78215      | \$487,500 x               |                     |
| Big Brothers/Big Sisters of Bucks County, Inc              | Jamison      | PA    | 18929      | \$82,000 x                |                     |
| Breaking the Chains Foundation                             | Hyattsville  | MD    | 20781      | \$120,000 x               |                     |
| Center for Children  | LaPlata      | MD    | 20646      | \$47,044 x                |                     |
| Center For Community Alternatives, Inc                     | Syracuse     | NY    | 13202      | \$150,000 x               |                     |



## Exhibit 3 (continued)

| Organization   | City           | State | Zip   | Recommended funding level | Approved and Funded |
|--|----------------|-------|-------|---------------------------|---------------------|
| Center For Multicultural Human Services                        | Falls Church   | VA    | 22046 | \$100,000 x               |                     |
| Center For Youth and Families, Inc                             | Little Rock    | AR    | 72207 | \$525,000 x               |                     |
| Centerforce, Inc   | San Rafael     | CA    | 94901 | \$70,000 x                |                     |
| Chatham County Together!                                       | Pittsboro      | NC    | 27312 | \$30,000 x                |                     |
| City of Longview   | Longview       | TX    | 75601 | \$175,000 x               |                     |
| Committed Partners for Youth                                   | Eugene         | OR    | 97401 | \$75,000 x                |                     |
| Community Service Center, Inc.                                 | New Orleans    | LA    | 70115 | \$62,500 x                |                     |
| Denver County Area Youth Services                              | Denver         | CO    | 80223 | \$100,000 x               |                     |
| Deschutes County   | Bend           | OR    | 97701 | \$62,500 x                |                     |
| Edwin Gould Services for Children and Families                 | New York       | NY    | 10029 | \$75,000 x                |                     |
| Franklin Williamson Human Services, Inc                        | West Frankfort | IL    | 62896 | \$75,000 x                |                     |
| Girl Scouts of Rolling Hills Council                           | North Branch   | NJ    | 08876 | \$60,000.00 x             |                     |
| Girl Scouts-Totem Council                                      | Seattle        | WA    | 98109 | \$67,500 x                |                     |
| Governor's Office of Criminal Justice Planning                 | Sacramento     | CA    | 95814 | \$270,000 x               |                     |
| Governor's Partnership to Protect Connecticut; Workforce, Inc. | Hartford       | CT    | 06106 | \$225,000 x               |                     |
| Hawaii Youth Services Network                                  | Honolulu       | HI    | 96813 | \$165,000 x               |                     |

## Exhibit 3 (continued)

| Organization  | City         | State | Zip        | Recommended funding level | Approved and Funded |
|---|--------------|-------|------------|---------------------------|---------------------|
| Indiana Behavioral Health Choices, Inc.               | Indianapolis | IN    | 46205      | \$172,500 x               |                     |
| Little Dixie Community Action Agency                  | Hugo         | OK    | 74743      | \$60,000.00 x             |                     |
| MatchPoint of Arizona, Inc.                           | Phoenix      | AZ    | 85051      | \$75,000 x                |                     |
| Missoula County                                       | Missoula     | MT    | 59802      | \$60,000.00 x             |                     |
| Montana Human Resources Development Council Directors | Bozeman      | MT    | 59715      | \$112,500 x               |                     |
| Montgomery County Youth Services, Inc                 | Conroe       | TX    | 77305      | \$75,000 x                |                     |
| Northern Valley Catholic Social Services              | Redding      | CA    | 96001      | \$120,000 x               |                     |
| Nutmeg Big Brothers Big Sisters                       | Hartford     | CT    | 06106-1377 | \$270,000 x               |                     |
| Path of Life Ministries                               | Riverside    | CA    | 92507      | \$480,000 x               |                     |
| Pima Prevention Partnership                           | Tucson       | AZ    | 85745      | \$195,000 x               |                     |
| Pittsburgh Leadership Foundation                      | Pittsburgh   | PA    | 15219      | \$180,000 x               |                     |
| San Diego Youth and Community Services, Inc           | San Diego    | CA    | 92110      | \$150,000 x               |                     |

## Exhibit 4

### CzechInvest – Legislation versus Discretion

The story is not put down clearly enough. Sometimes it requires a deeper knowledge and a thorough studying to make out the sense.

There is no space left for a student to make his own mind. Instead of simply stating facts, throughout the whole text a stance is being taken by authors: incentives are good, their opponents are not right and are going to lose the battle (for example - „the gov. approach was not a lucky one“, „the invisible hand is good just for economic textbooks“).

Although the situation is followed deep into the history in great detail, at the moment where the story ends and when the whole government and probably the whole set (important figures and their stances) changes, all we provide the students with is one sentence. Students need to know what the actual environment for his decision is at the moment of decision-making. So, should not the past be described more in brief leaving more space for the critical moment description?

There is very little said about the two options (legislation and discretion) and the clash between supporters and opponents. The text should concentrate more on the conflict and support the basic question. The story is narrated in a way that after having read the paper, one asks himself: what is the point?

### Prague City Hall – Reform from Inside or Out

The Case should be ended prior to exposing Kasl's decision. It is to be an action forcing teaching case not retrospective case.

There is not enough information presented in the case study regarding the choice Kasl had. Although most of the events forced a decision on him, he faced one major choice: he could have left the mayor post quietly and perhaps have gotten another position within the party or could have done what he did. That is what we meant by reform from inside or outside.

The case is „written around“ the main character, which is good, but there are only a few quotes of other involved subjects or observers that would edge the situation towards the reader more. Isn't the case too much of a one-man-show?

Luncheon at The American Chamber of Commerce in CR – interpretation of the Kasl's quotation is slightly different. Kasl's was a direct response to the lunchtime conversation, not a chance remark.

### CzechInvest -Putting Private Sector Management into Public Sector

The case is rather description of historical development than a description of a decision-making situation. I would prefer, if the case was written from the perspective of the main actor Martin Jahn from the very beginning and described facts which Jahn could have considered while formulating strategy of new business-like management.

I would prefer different structure – not the chronological one but rather according to topics, which would allow Jahn to be the main character from the beginning. (By *chronological* I mean – HR in during communist regime described at beginning of the case, HR in during past director times described in the middle, HR when Jahn was appointed described at the end; and *according to topics* HR described at one place in the case).

**Exhibit 4 (continued)**

There are too many facts, which are not connected to management. And on the contrary very few facts about things important for management – what is the product, who are customers (investors) and suppliers (Ministries, government), facts of internal and external environment, so that student could think of all possible ways how to manage these factors in order the agency were successful. The case should provide all possible facts that the decision-maker could have taken into consideration and the student should choose, which of them are important.

Case is not conflict provoking, lack of controversy. X retrospect case.

It seems that there is no need for decision-making in the case. And it does not offer any options.

Conclusions or perhaps opinion of writers are presented there.

Is the case concise enough?

Is the case generalizable?